CHAPTER I

HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED

been and are either republics or principalities.

Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been

long established; or they are new.

The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza,

or they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of

the prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that

of the King of Spain.

Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a

prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms

of the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability.

CHAPTER II

CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES

I WILL leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another

place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only

to principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated

above, and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and

preserved.

I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary

states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince,

than new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs

of his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they

arise, for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his

state, unless he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive

force; and if he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything

sinister happens to the usurper, he will regain it.

We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not

have withstood the attacks of the Venetians in '84, nor those of

Pope Julius in '10, unless he had been long established in his

dominions. For the hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity

to offend; hence it happens that he will be more loved; and unless

extraordinary vices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to

expect that his subjects will be naturally well disposed towards

him; and in the antiquity and duration of his rule the memories and

motives that make for change are lost, for one change always leaves

the toothing for another.

CHAPTER III

CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES

BUT the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it

be not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which,

taken collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly

from an inherent difficulty which there is in all new

principalities; for men change their rulers willingly, hoping to

better themselves, and this hope induces them to take up arms

against him who rules: wherein they are deceived, because they

afterwards find by experience they have gone from bad to worse. This

follows also on another natural and common necessity, which always

causes a new prince to burden those who have submitted to him with his

soldiery and with infinite other hardships which he must put upon

his new acquisition.

In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in

seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those

friends who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy

them in the way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures

against them, feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very

strong in armed forces, yet in entering a province one has always need

of the goodwill of the natives.

For these reasons Louis XII, King of France, quickly occupied Milan,

and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it only

needed Lodovico's own forces; because those who had opened the gates

to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future

benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is

very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time,

they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with

little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish

the delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen

himself in the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan

the first time it was enough for the Duke Lodovico to raise

insurrections on the borders; but to cause him to lose it a second

time it was necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that

his armies should be defeated and driven out of Italy; which

followed from the causes above mentioned.

Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the

second time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it

remains to name those for the second, and to see what resources he

had, and what any one in his situation would have had for

maintaining himself more securely in his acquisition than did the King

of France.

Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an

ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country

and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold

them, especially when they have not been accustomed to

self-government; and to hold them securely it is enough to have

destroyed the family of the prince who was ruling them; because the

two peoples, preserving in other things the old conditions, and not

being unlike in customs, will live quietly together, as one has seen

in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been bound to

France for so long a time: and, although there may be some

difference in language, nevertheless the customs are alike, and the

people will easily be able to get on amongst themselves. He who has

annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind

two considerations: the one, that the family of their former lord is

extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes are

altered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one

body with the old principality.

But when states are acquired in a country differing in language,

customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great

energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most

real helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside

there. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has

made that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other

measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled

there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on

the spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly

remedy them; but if one is not at hand, they heard of only when they

are one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the country is not

pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied by prompt

recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have more cause

to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He who would

attack that state from the outside must have the utmost caution; as

long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested from him

with the greatest difficulty.

The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two

places, which may be as keys to that state, for it necessary either to

do this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and

infantry. A prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or

no expense he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends

a minority only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to

give them to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining

poor and scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest

being uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are

anxious not to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to

those who have been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these

colonies are not costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and

the injured, as has been said, I being poor and scattered, cannot

hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men ought either to be well

treated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of lighter

injuries, of more serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury

that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does

not stand in fear of revenge.

But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends

much more, having to consume on the garrison all income from the

state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are

exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the

shifting of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with

hardship, and all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst

beaten on their own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason,

therefore, such guards are as useless as a colony is useful.

Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above

respects ought to make himself the head and defender of his powerful

neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking

care that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any

accident, get a footing there; for it will always happen that such a

one will be introduced by those who are discontented, either through

excess of ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The

Romans were brought into Greece by the Aetolians; and in every other

country where they obtained a footing they were brought in by the

inhabitants. And the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a

powerful foreigner enters a country, all the subject states are

drawn to him, moved by the hatred which they feel against the ruling

power. So that in respect to these subject states he has not to take

any trouble to gain them over to himself, for the whole of them

quickly rally to the state which he has acquired there. He has only to

take care that they do not get hold of too much power and too much

authority, and then with his own forces, and with their goodwill, he

can easily keep down the more powerful of them, so as to remain

entirely master in the country. And he who does not properly manage

this business will soon lose what he has acquired, and whilst he

does hold it he will have endless difficulties and troubles.

The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely

these measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations

with the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept

down the greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to

gain authority. Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The

Achaeans and Aetolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of

Macedonia was humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the

Achaeans and Aetolians never secured for them permission to increase

their power, nor did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the

Romans to be his friends without first humbling him, nor did the

influence of Antiochus make them agree that he should retain any

lordship over the country. Because the Romans did in these instances

what all prudent princes ought to do, who have to regard not only

present troubles, but also future ones, for which they must prepare

with every energy, because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy

them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine is no longer

in time because the malady has become incurable; for it happens in

this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the

beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but difficult to detect,

but in the course of time, not having been either detected or

treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to

cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the evils that

arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to

see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been

foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can

see them. there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans,

foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a

war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war is

not to be avoided, but is only put off to the advantage of others;

moreover they wished to fight with Philip and Antiochus in Greece so

as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have avoided both, but

this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which is for

ever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:- Let us enjoy the

benefits of the time- but rather the benefits of their own valour

and prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to

bring with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good.

But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of

the things mentioned. I will speak of Louis [XII] (and not of

Charles [VIII]) as the one whose conduct is the better to be observed,

he having held possession of Italy for the longest period; and you

will see that he has done the opposite to those things which ought

to be done to retain a state composed of divers elements.

King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the

Venetians, who desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his

intervention. I will not blame the course taken by the king,

because, wishing to get a foothold in Italy, and having no friends

there- seeing rather that every door was shut to him owing to the

conduct of Charles- he was forced to accept those friendships which he

could get, and he would have succeeded very quickly in his design if

in other matters he had not made some mistakes. The king, however,

having acquired Lombardy, regained at once the authority which Charles

had lost: Genoa yielded; the Florentines became his friends; the

Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the Bentivoglio, my lady of

Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of

Piombino, the Lucchesi, the Pisans, the Sienese- everybody made

advances to him to become his friend. Then could the Venetians realize

the rashness of the course taken by them, which, in order that they

might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made the king master of

two-thirds of Italy.

Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king

could have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the

rules above laid down, and kept all his friends secure and

protected; for although they were numerous they were both weak and

timid, some afraid of the Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they

would always have been forced to stand in with him, and by their means

he could easily have made himself secure against those who remained

powerful. But he was no sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by

assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to

him that by this action he was weakening himself, depriving himself of

friends and those who had thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he

aggrandized the Church by adding much temporal power to the spiritual,

thus giving it great authority. And having committed this prime error,

he was obliged to follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to

the ambition of Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of

Tuscany, he was himself forced to come into Italy.

And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and

deprived himself friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples,

divides it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime

arbiter of Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of

that country and the malcontents of his own should have where to

shelter; and whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own

pensioner as king, he drove him out, to put one there who was able

to drive him, Louis, out in turn.

The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men

always do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not

blamed; but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means,

then there is folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have

attacked Naples with her own forces she ought to have done so; if

she could not, then she ought not to have divided it. And if the

partition which she made with the Venetians in Lombardy was

justified by the excuse that by it she got a foothold in Italy, this

other partition merited blame, for it had not the excuse of that

necessity.

Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor

powers, he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in

Italy, he brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the

country, he did not send colonies. Which errors, if he had lived, were

not enough to injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away

their dominions from the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized

the Church, nor brought Spain into Italy, it would have been very

reasonable and necessary to humble them; but having first taken

these steps, he ought never to have consented to their ruin, for they,

being powerful, would always have kept off others from designs on

Lombardy, to which the Venetians would never have consented except

to become masters themselves there; also because the others would

not wish to take Lombardy from France in order to give it to the

Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not have had the

courage.

And if any one should say: King Louis yielded the Romagna to

Alexander and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war, I answer for the

reasons given above that a blunder ought never be perpetrated to avoid

war, because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your

disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the king

had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in

exchange for the dissolution of his marriage and for the hat to Rouen,

to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the faith of

princes, and how it ought to be kept.

Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the

conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries

and wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but

much that is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I

spoke at Nantes with Rouen, when Valentino,* as Cesare Borgia, the son

of Pope Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on

Cardinal Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand

war, I replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft,

meaning that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach

such greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the

Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin

may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which

never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming

powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about

either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by

him who has been raised to power.

* So called- in Italian- from the duchy of Valentinois, conferred on

him by Louis XII.

CHAPTER IV

WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER,

DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH

CONSIDERING the difficulties which men have had to hold a newly

acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great

became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was yet

scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole

empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained

themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which

arose among themselves from their own ambitions.

I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found

to be governed in two different ways: either by a prince, with a

body of servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by

his favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that

dignity by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such

barons have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords

and hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed

by a prince and his servants hold their prince in more

consideration, because in all the country there is no one who is

recognized as superior to him, and if they yield obedience to

another they do it as to a minister and official, and they do not bear

him any particular affection.

The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and

the King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one

lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into

sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and

changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the

midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects,

and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the

king take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who

considers both of these states will recognize great difficulties in

seizing the state of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease

in holding it. The causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom

of the Turk are that the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of

the kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his designs by the

revolt of those whom the lord has around him. This arises from the

reasons given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and

bondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can

expect little advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as

they cannot carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned.

Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him

united, and he will have to rely more on his own strength than on

the revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and

routed in the field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies,

there is nothing to fear but the family of the prince, and, this being

exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the others having no

credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not rely on them

before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it.

The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France,

because one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the

kingdom, for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change.

Such men, for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and

render the victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you

meet with infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you

and from those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have

exterminated the family of the prince, because the lords that remain

make themselves the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you

are unable either to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost

whenever time brings the opportunity.

Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of

Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and

therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow

him in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which

victory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to

Alexander, for the above reasons. And if his successors had been

united they would have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for

there were no tumults raised in the kingdom except those they provoked

themselves.

But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states

constituted like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions

against the Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many

principalities there were in these states, of which, as long as the

memory of them endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession;

but with the power and long continuance of the empire the memory of

them passed away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And

when fighting afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to

attach to himself his own parts of the country, according to the

authority he had assumed there; and the family of the former lord

being exterminated, none other than the Romans were acknowledged.

When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with

which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties

which others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many

more; this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability

in the conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state.

CHAPTER V

CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH

LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED

accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are

three courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin

them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit

them to live under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing

within it an oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because

such a government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot

stand without his friendship and interest, and does its utmost to

support him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to

freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than

in any other way.

There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans

held Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy,

nevertheless they lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua,

Carthage, and Numantia, dismantled them, and did not lose them. They

wished to hold Greece as the Spartans held it, making it free and

permitting its laws, and did not succeed. So to hold it they were

compelled to dismantle many cities in the country, for in truth

there is no safe way to retain them otherwise than by ruining them.

And he who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom and does not

destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, for in rebellion it

has always the watch-word of liberty and its ancient privileges as a

rallying point, which neither time nor benefits will ever cause it

to forget. And what ever you may do or provide against, they never

forget that name or their privileges unless they are disunited or

dispersed but at every chance they immediately rally to them, as

Pisa after the hundred years she had been held in bondage by the

Florentines.

But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a

prince, and his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand

accustomed to obey and on the other hand not having the old prince,

cannot agree in making one from amongst themselves, and they do not

know how to govern themselves. For this reason they are very slow to

take up arms, and a prince can gain them to himself and secure them

much more easily. But in republics there is more vitality, greater

hatred, and more desire for vengeance, which will never permit them to

allow the memory of their former liberty to rest; so that the safest

way is to destroy them or to reside there.

CHAPTER VI

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED

BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY

LET no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new

principalities as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of

prince and of state; because men, walking almost always in paths

beaten by others, and following by imitation their deeds, are yet

unable to keep entirely to the ways of others or attain to the power

of those they imitate. A wise man ought always to follow the paths

beaten by great men, and to imitate those who have been supreme, so

that if his ability does not equal theirs, at least it will savour

of it. Let him act like the clever archers who, designing to hit the

mark which yet appears too far distant, and knowing the limits to

which the strength of their bow attains, take aim much higher than the

mark, not to reach by their strength or arrow to so great a height,

but to be able with the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark they

wish to reach.

I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there

is a new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them,

accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired

the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private

station presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or

other of these two things will mitigate in some degree many

difficulties. Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is

established the strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the

prince, having no other state, is compelled to reside there in person.

But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through

fortune, have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus,

Theseus, and such like are the most excellent examples. And although

one may not discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the

will of God, yet he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which

made him worthy to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others

who have acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable;

and if their particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they

will not be found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great

a preceptor. And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see

that they owed anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought

them the material to mould into the form which seemed best to them.

Without that opportunity their powers of mind would have been

extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity would have come

in vain.

It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people

of Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order

that they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out

of bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba,

and that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he

should become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was

necessary that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the

government of the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through

their long peace. Theseus could not have shown his ability had he

not found the Athenians dispersed. These opportunities, therefore,

made those men fortunate, and their high ability enabled them to

recognize the opportunity whereby their country was ennobled and

made famous.

Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a

principality with difficulty, but they it with ease. The

difficulties they have in acquiring it arise in part from the new

rules and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish

their government and its security. And it ought to be remembered

that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to

conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in

the introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has

for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and

lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This

coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws

on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not

readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of

them. Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the

opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others

defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along

with them.

It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter

thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves

or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate

their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In

the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass

anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then

they are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have

conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the

reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it

is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that

persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that,

when they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe

by force.

If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could

not have enforced their constitutions for long- as happened in our

time to Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order

of things immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and

he had no means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making

the unbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these have great

difficulties in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers

are in the ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but

when these are overcome, and those who envied them their success are

exterminated, they will begin to be respected, and they will

continue afterwards powerful, secure, honoured, and happy.

To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears

some resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a

like kind: it is Hiero the Syracusan. This man rose from a private

station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything

to fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose

him for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made

their prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen,

that one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to

be a king. This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new,

gave up old alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers

and allies, on such foundations he was able to build any edifice:

thus, whilst he had endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but

little in keeping.

CHAPTER VII

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED

EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE

citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they

have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they

have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some

state is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows

it; as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the

Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they

might hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also

were those emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being

citizens came to empire. Such stand simply upon the goodwill and the

fortune of him who has elevated them- two most inconstant and unstable

things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position;

because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not

reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having

always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it

because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and

faithful.

States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature

which are born and grow rapidly, cannot have their foundations and

relations with other states fixed in such a way that the first storm

will not overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly

become princes are men of so much ability that they know they have

to be prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into

their laps, and that those foundations, which others have laid

before they became princes, they must lay afterwards.

Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability

or fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection,

and these are Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper

means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be

Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand

anxieties he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare

Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during

the ascendancy of his father, and on its decline he lost it,

notwithstanding that he had taken every measure and done all that

ought to be done by a wise and able man to fix firmly his roots in the

states which the arms and fortunes of others had bestowed on him.

Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his

foundations may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but

they will be laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the

building. If, therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be

considered, it will be seen that he laid solid foundations for his

future power, and I do not consider it superfluous to discuss them,

because I do not know what better precepts to give a new prince than

the example of his actions; and if his dispositions were of no

avail, that was not his fault, but the extraordinary and extreme

malignity of fortune.

Alexander VI, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had many

immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see his

way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the

Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the

Duke of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza

and Rimini were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides

this, he saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might

have been assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the

Pope, namely, the Orsini and the Colonna and their following. It

behoved him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the

powers, so as to make himself securely master of part of their states.

This was easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved

by other reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he

would not only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by

dissolving the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king

came into Italy with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent

of Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers

from him for the attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the

reputation of the king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the

Romagna and beaten the Colonna, while wishing to hold that and to

advance further, was hindered by two things: the one, his forces did

not appear loyal to him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to

say, he feared that the forces of the Orsini, which was using, would

not stand to him, that not only might they hinder him from winning

more, but might themselves seize what he had won, and that the King

might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when, after

taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go very unwillingly

to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mind when he

himself, after taking the duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the

king made him desist from that undertaking; hence the duke decided

to depend no more upon the arms and the luck of others.

For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonna parties in

Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen,

making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to

their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way

that in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed

and turned entirely to the duke. After this he awaited an

opportunity to crush the Orsini, having scattered the adherents of the

Colonna. This came to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini,

perceiving at length that the aggrandizement of the duke and the

Church was ruin to them, called a meeting at Magione, in the territory

of Perugia. From this sprung the rebellion at Urbino and the tumults

in the Romagna, with endless dangers to the duke, all of which he

overcame with the help of the French. Having restored his authority,

not to leave it at risk by trusting either to the French or other

outside forces, he had recourse to his wiles, and he knew so well

how to conceal his mind that, by the mediation of Signor Paolo

[Orsini]- whom the duke did not fail to secure with all kinds of

attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses- the Orsini were

reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his power at

Sinigaglia. Having exterminated the leaders, and turned their

partisans into his friends, the duke had laid sufficiently good

foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the duchy of

Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity,

he gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of

notice, and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it

out.

When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of

weak masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and

gave them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the

country was full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and

so, wishing to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he

considered it necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he

promoted Messer Ramiro d'Orco [de Lorqua], a swift and cruel man, to

whom he gave the fullest power. This man in a short time restored

peace and unity with the greatest success. Afterwards the duke

considered that it was not advisable to confer such excessive

authority, for he had no doubt but that he would become odious, so

he set up a court of judgment in the country, under a most excellent

president, wherein all cities had their advocates. And because he knew

that the past severity had caused some hatred against himself, so,

to clear himself in the minds of the people, and gain them entirely to

himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty had been practised,

it had not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of the

minister. Under this pretence he took Ramiro, and one morning caused

him to be executed and left on the piazza at Cesena with the block and

a bloody knife at his side. The barbarity of this spectacle caused the

people to be at once satisfied and dismayed.

But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding

himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate

dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a

great measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure

him if he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider

France, for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his

mistake, would not support him. And from this time he began to seek

new alliances and to temporize with France in the expedition which she

was making towards the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who

were besieging Gaeta. It was his intention to secure himself against

them, and this he would have quickly accomplished had Alexander lived.

Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the

future he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the

Church might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him

that which Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways.

Firstly, by exterminating the families of those lords whom he had

despoiled, so as to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by

winning to himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb

the Pope with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by

converting the college more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much

power before the Pope should die that he could by his own measures

resist the first shock. Of these four things, at the death of

Alexander, he had accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the

dispossessed lords as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he

had won over the Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party

in the college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become

master of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino,

and Pisa was under his protection. And as he had no longer to study

France (for the French were already driven out of the kingdom of

Naples by the Spaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy

his goodwill), he pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and

Siena yielded at once, partly through hatred and partly through fear

of the Florentines; and the Florentines would have had no remedy had

he continued to prosper, as he was prospering the year that

Alexander died, for he had acquired so much power and reputation

that he would have stood by himself, and no longer have depended on

the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his own power and

ability.

But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He

left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the

rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick

unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability,

and he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were

the foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had

not had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he

would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his

foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a

month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and

whilst the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome,

they could not effect anything against him. If he could not have

made Pope him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish

would not have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the

death of Alexander, everything would have been easy to him. On the day

that Julius II was elected, he told me that he had thought of

everything that might occur at the death of his father, and had

provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated

that, when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to

die.

When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how

to blame him, but rather it appears to me, as I have said, that I

ought to offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or

the arms of others, are raised to government. Because he, having a

lofty spirit and far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his

conduct otherwise, and only the shortness of the life of Alexander and

his own sickness frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers

it necessary to secure himself in his new principality, to win

friends, to overcome either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved

and feared by the people, to be followed and revered by the

soldiers, to exterminate those who have power or reason to hurt him,

to change the old order of things for new, to be severe and

gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to destroy a disloyal soldiery

and to create new, to maintain friendship with kings and princes in

such a way that they must help him with zeal and offend with

caution, cannot find a more lively example than the actions of this

man.

Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius II, in whom he made

a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope to

his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected

Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of any

cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they

became pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom

he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna,

San Giorgio, and Ascanio.* Any one of the others, on becoming Pope,

would have had to fear him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the

latter from their relationship and obligations, the former from his

influence, the kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore,

above everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and,

failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad

Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages

to forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his

choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.

* Julius II had been Cardinal of San Pietro ad Vincula; San

Giorgio was Raffaells Riaxis, and Ascanio was Cardinal Ascanio Sforza.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY

BY WICKEDNESS

ALTHOUGH a prince may rise from a private station in two ways,

neither of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius,

yet it is manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although

one could be more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These

methods are when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends

to the principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a

private person becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of

the first method, it will be illustrated by two examples- one ancient,

the other modern- and without entering further into the subject, I

consider these two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to

follow them.

Agathocles, the Sicilian, became King of Syracuse not only from a

private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a

potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous

life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability

of mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military

profession, he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being

established in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make

himself prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others,

that which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an

understanding for this purpose with Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, who,

with his army, was fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the

people and senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them

things relating to the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers

killed all the senators and the richest of the people; these dead,

he seized and held the princedom of that city without any civil

commotion. And although he was twice routed by the Carthaginians,

and ultimately besieged, yet not only was he able to defend his

city, but leaving part of his men for its defence, with the others

he attacked Africa, and in a short time raised the siege of

Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were

compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to

him, had to be content with the possession of Africa.

Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man

will see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune,

inasmuch as he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the

favour of any one, but step by step in the military profession,

which steps were gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and

were afterwards boldly held by him with many hazards and dangers.

Yet it cannot be called talent to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive

friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; such

methods may gain empire, but not glory. Still, if the courage of

Agathocles in entering into and extricating himself from dangers be

considered, together with his greatness of mind in enduring overcoming

hardships, it cannot be seen why he should be esteemed less than the

most notable captain. Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and

inhumanity with infinite wickednesses do not permit him to be

celebrated among the most excellent men. What he achieved cannot be

attributed either to fortune or to genius.

In our times, during the rule of Alexander VI, Oliverotto da

Fermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by

his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his

youth sent to fight under Paolo Vitelli, that, being trained under his

discipline, he might attain some high position in the military

profession. After Paolo died, he fought under his brother

Vitellozzo, and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a

vigorous body and mind, he became the first man in his profession. But

it appearing to him a paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved,

with the aid of some citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their

country was dearer than its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelli,

to seize Fermo. So he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been

away from home for many years, he wished to visit him and his city,

and in some measure to look into his patrimony; and although he had

not laboured to acquire anything except honour, yet, in order that the

citizens should see he had not spent his time in vain, he desired to

come honourably, so would be accompanied by one hundred horsemen,

his friends and retainers; and he entreated Giovanni to arrange that

he should be received honourably by the citizens of Fermo, all of

which would be not only to his honour, but also to that of Giovanni

himself, who had brought him up.

Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his

nephew, and he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermans,

and he lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days,

and having arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs,

Oliverotto gave a solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani

and the chiefs of Fermo. When the viands and all the other

entertainments that are usual in such banquets were finished,

Oliverotto artfully began certain grave discourses, speaking of the

greatness of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare, and of their

enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and others answered; but he

rose at once, saying that such matters ought to be discussed in a more

private place, and he betook himself to a chamber, whither Giovanni

and the rest of the citizens went in after him. No sooner were they

seated than soldiers issued from secret places and slaughtered

Giovanni and the rest. After these murders Oliverotto, mounted on

horseback, rode up and down the town and besieged the chief magistrate

in the palace, so that in fear the people were forced to obey him, and

to form a government, of which he made himself the prince. He killed

all the malcontents who were able to injure him, and strengthened

himself with new civil and military ordinances, in such a way that, in

the year during which he held the principality, not only was he secure

in the city of Fermo, but he had become formidable to all his

neighbours. And his destruction would have been as difficult as that

of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be overreached by

Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigaglia,

as was stated above. Thus one year after he had committed this

parricide, he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had

made his leader in valour and wickedness.

Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like,

after infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long

secure in his country, and defend himself from external enemies, and

never be conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many

others, by means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful

times to hold the state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I

believe that this follows from severities being badly or properly

used. Those may be called properly used, if of evil it is lawful to

speak well, that are applied at one blow and are necessary to one's

security, and that are not persisted in afterwards unless they can

be turned to the advantage of the subjects. The badly employed are

those which, notwithstanding they may be few in the commencement,

multiply with time rather than decrease. Those who practise the

first system are able, by aid of God or man, to mitigate in some

degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is impossible for those who

follow the other to maintain themselves.

Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper

ought to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary

for him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have

to repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able

to reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does

otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to

keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor

can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and

repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so

that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be

given little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer.

And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in

such a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or

evil, shall make him change; because if the necessity for this comes

in troubled times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild

ones will not help you, for they will be considered as forced from

you, and no one will be under any obligation to you for them.

CHAPTER IX

CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY

BUT coming to the other point- where a leading citizen becomes the

prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable

violence, but by the favour of his fellow citizens- this may be called

a civil principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to

attain to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a

principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by

the favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct

parties are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish

to be ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule

and oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there

arises in cities one of three results, either a principality,

self-government, or anarchy.

A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles,

accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the

nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the

reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that

under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people,

finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of

one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his

authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the

nobles maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to

it by the aid of the people, because the former finds himself with

many around him who consider themselves his equals, and because of

this he can neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who

reaches sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has

none around him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him.

Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to

others, satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for

their object is more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter

wishing to oppress, whilst the former only desire not to be oppressed.

It is to be added also that a prince can never secure himself

against a hostile people, because of their being too many, whilst from

the nobles he can secure himself, as they are few in number. The worst

that a prince may expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by

them; but from hostile nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but

also that they will rise against him; for they, being in these affairs

more far-seeing and astute, always come forward in time to save

themselves, and to obtain favours from him whom they expect to

prevail. Further, the prince is compelled to live always with the same

people, but he can do well without the same nobles, being able to make

and unmake them daily, and to give or take away authority when it

pleases him.

Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought

to be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either

shape their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your

fortune, or they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not

rapacious, ought to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind

themselves may be dealt with in two ways; they may fail to do this

through pusillanimity and a natural want of courage, in which case you

ought to make use of them, especially of those who are of good

counsel; and thus, whilst in prosperity you honour yourself, in

adversity you have not to fear them. But when for their own

ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it is a token that they

are giving more thought to themselves than to you, and a prince

ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they were open

enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him.

Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people

ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they

only ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the

people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above

everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may

easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when

they receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound

more closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become

more devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality

by their favours; and the prince can win their affections in many

ways, but as these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give

fixed rules, so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a

prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has no security in

adversity.

Nabis, Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece,

and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his

country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it

was only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but

this would not have been sufficient if the people had been hostile.

And do not let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb

that 'He who builds on the people, builds on the mud,' for this is

true when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades

himself that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his

enemies or by the magistrates; wherein he would find himself very

often deceived, as happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer

Giorgio Scali in Florence. But granted a prince who has established

himself as above, who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed

in adversity, who does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by

his resolution and energy, keeps the whole people encouraged- such a

one will never find himself deceived in them, and it will be shown

that he has laid his foundations well.

These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from

the civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either

rule personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their

government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on

the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and

who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with

great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has

not the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because

the citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from

magistrates, are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions,

and there will always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he

can trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in

quiet times, when citizens had need of the state, because then every

one agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is far distant

they all wish to die for him; but in troubled times, when the state

has need of its citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the

more is this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried

once. Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his

citizens will always in every sort and kind of circumstance have

need of the state and of him, and then he will always find them

faithful.

CHAPTER X

CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH

OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED

IT IS necessary to consider another point in examining the character

of these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power

that, in case of need, he can support himself with his own

resources, or whether he has always need of the assistance of

others. And to make this quite clear I say that I consider those are

able to support themselves by their own resources who can, either by

abundance of men or money, raise a sufficient army to join battle

against any one who comes to attack them; and I consider those

always to have need of others who cannot show themselves against the

enemy in the field, but are forced to defend themselves by

sheltering behind walls. The first case has been discussed, but we

will speak of it again should it recur. In the second case one can say

nothing except to encourage such princes to provision and fortify

their towns, and not on any account to defend the country. And whoever

shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the other concerns

of his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often repeated,

will never be attacked without great caution, for men are always

adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it will

be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his town well

fortified, and is not hated by his people.

The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little

country around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it

suits them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have

near them, because they are fortified in such a way that every one

thinks the taking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult,

seeing they have proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient

artillery, and they always keep in public depots enough for one year's

eating, drinking, and firing. And beyond this, to keep the people

quiet and without loss to the state, they always have the means of

giving work to the community in those labours that are the life and

strength of the city, and on the pursuit of which the people are

supported; they also hold military exercises in repute, and moreover

have many ordinances to uphold them.

Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made

himself odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he

will only be driven off with disgrace; again, because that affairs

of this world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an

army a whole year in the field without being interfered with. And

whoever should reply: If the people have property outside the city,

and see it burnt, they will not remain patient, and the long siege and

self-interest will make them forget their prince; to this I answer

that a powerful and courageous prince will overcome all such

difficulties by giving at one time hope to his subjects that the

evil will not be for long, at another time fear of the cruelty of

the enemy, then preserving himself adroitly from those subjects who

seem to him to be too bold.

Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and

ruin the country at the time when the spirits of the people are

still hot and ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the

less ought the prince to hesitate; because after a time, when

spirits have cooled, the damage is already done, the ills are

incurred, and there is no longer any remedy; and therefore they are so

much the more ready to unite with their prince, he appearing to be

under obligations to them now that their houses have been burnt and

their possessions ruined in his defence. For it is the nature of men

to be bound by the benefits they confer as much as by those they

receive. Therefore, if everything is well considered, it wilt not be

difficult for a wise prince to keep the minds of his citizens

steadfast from first to last, when he does not fail to support and

defend them.

CHAPTER XI

CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES

IT ONLY remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities,

touching which all difficulties are prior to getting possession,

because they are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they

can be held without either; for they are sustained by the ordinances

of religion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that

the principalities may be held no matter how their princes behave

and live. These princes alone have states and do not defend them, they

have subjects and do not rule them; and the states, although

unguarded, are not taken from them, and the subjects, although not

ruled, do not care, and they have neither the desire nor the ability

to alienate themselves. Such principalities only are secure and happy.

But being upheld by powers, to which the human mind cannot reach, I

shall speak no more of them, because, being exalted and maintained

by God, it would be the act of a presumptuous and rash man to

discuss them.

Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the

Church has attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from

Alexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have

been called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest)

have valued the temporal power very slightly- yet now a king of France

trembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy,

and to ruin the Venetians- although this may be very manifest, it does

not appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory.

Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy, this country

was under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples,

the Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two

principal anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy

under arms; the other, that none of themselves should seize more

territory. Those about whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope

and the Venetians. To restrain the Venetians the union of all the

others was necessary, as it was for the defence of Ferrara; and to

keep down the Pope they made use of the barons of Rome, who, being

divided into two factions, Orsini and Colonna, had always a pretext

for disorder, and, standing with arms in their hands under the eyes of

the Pontiff, kept the pontificate weak and powerless. And although

there might arise sometimes a courageous pope, such as Sixtus [IV],

yet neither fortune nor wisdom could rid him of these annoyances.

And the short life of a pope is also a cause of weakness; for in the

ten years, which is the average life of a pope, he can with difficulty

lower one of the factions; and if, so to speak, one pope should almost

destroy the Colonna, another would arise hostile to the Orsini, who

would support their opponents, and yet would not have time to ruin the

Orsini. This was the reason why the temporal powers of the pope were

little esteemed in Italy.

Alexander VI arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that have

ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to

prevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by

reason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things

which I have discussed above in the actions of the duke. And

although his intention was not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke,

nevertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the

Church, which, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the

heir to all his labours.

Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong,

possessing all the Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence,

and, through the chastisements Alexander, the factions wiped out; he

also found the way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had

never been practised before Alexander's time. Such things Julius not

only followed, but improved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna,

to ruin the Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of

these enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his

credit, inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not

any private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonna factions

within the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among

them some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things

firm: the one, the greatness of the church, with which he terrified

them; and the other, not allowing them to have their own cardinals,

who caused the disorders among them. For whenever these factions

have their cardinals they do not remain quiet for long, because

cardinals foster the factions in Rome and out of it, and the barons

are compelled to support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates

arise disorders and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his

Holiness Pope Leo found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to be

hoped that, if others made it great in arms, he will make it still

greater and more venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues.

CHAPTER XII

HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES

HAVING discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such

principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having

considered in some degree the causes of their being good or bad, and

having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and

to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means

of offence and defence which belong to each of them.

We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his

foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to

ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or

composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good

laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are

well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the

discussion and shall speak of the arms.

I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his

state are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or

mixed. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if

one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm

nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious and without discipline,

unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have

neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is

deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed

by them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other

attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend,

which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They

are ready enough to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but

if war comes they take themselves off or run from the foe; which I

should have little trouble to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been

caused by nothing else than by resting all her hopes for many years on

mercenaries, and although they formerly made some display and appeared

valiant amongst themselves, yet when the foreigners came they showed

what they were. Thus it was that Charles, King of France, was

allowed to seize Italy with chalk in hand;* and he who told us that

our sins were the cause of it told the truth, but they were not the

sins he imagined, but those which I have related. And as they were the

sins of princes, it is the princes who have also suffered the penalty.

* With which to chalk up the billets for his soldiers.

I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The

mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they

are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own

greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others

contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you

are ruined in the usual way.

And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way,

whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted

to, either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in

person and perform the duty of captain; the republic has to send its

citizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily,

it ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the

laws so that he does not leave the command. And experience has shown

princes and republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress,

and mercenaries doing nothing except damage; and it is more

difficult to bring a republic, armed with its own arms, under the sway

of one of its citizens than it is to bring one armed with foreign

arms. Rome and Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Switzers

are completely armed and quite free.

Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians,

who were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war

with the Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for

captains. After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made

captain of their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took

away their liberty.

Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza

against the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at

Caravaggio, allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his

masters. His father, Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna of

Naples, left her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw

herself into the arms of the King of Aragon, in order to save her

kingdom. And if the Venetians and Florentines formerly extended

their dominions by these arms, and yet their captains did not make

themselves princes, but have defended them, I reply that the

Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance, for of the able

captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some have not

conquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their

ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer was Giovanni Acuto,*

and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved; but

every one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the Florentines

would have stood at his discretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi always

against him, so they watched each other. Francesco turned his ambition

to Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But

let us come to that which happened a short while ago. The

Florentines appointed as their captain Paolo Vitelli, a most prudent

man, who from a private position had risen to the greatest renown.

If this man had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have been

proper for the Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became the

soldier of their enemies they had no means of resisting, and if they

held to him they must obey him. The Venetians, if their achievements

are considered, will be seen to have acted safely and gloriously so

long as they sent to war their own men, when with armed gentlemen

and plebeians they did valiantly. This was before they turned to

enterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land they forsook

this virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in the beginning

of their expansion on land, through not having much territory, and

because of their great reputation, they had not much to fear from

their captains; but when they expanded, as under Carmignola, they

had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him a most valiant

man (they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership), and, on the

other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they feared they

would no longer conquer under him, and for this reason they were not

willing, nor were they able, to let him go; and so, not to lose

again that which they had acquired, they were compelled, in order to

secure themselves, to murder him. They had afterwards for their

captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the Count

of Pitigliano, and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not

gain, as happened afterwards at Vaila, where in one battle they lost

that which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much

trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but slowly, long

delayed and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous.

* As Sir John Hawkwood, the English leader of mercenaries, was

called by the Italians.

And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been

ruled for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more

seriously, in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may

be better prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the

empire has recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope

has acquired more temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up

into more states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up

arms against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were

oppressing them, whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain

authority in temporal power: in many others their citizens became

princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell partly into the

hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of

priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both

commenced to enlist foreigners.

The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,

a native of the Romagna. From the school of this man sprang, among

others, Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of

Italy. After these came all the other captains who till now have

directed the arms of Italy; and the end of all their valour has

been, that she has been overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged

by Ferdinand, and insulted by the Switzers. The principle that has

guided them has been, first, to lower the credit of infantry so that

they might increase their own. They did this because, subsisting on

their pay and without territory, they were unable to support many

soldiers, and a few infantry did not give them any authority; so

they were led to employ cavalry, with a moderate force of which they

were maintained and honoured; and affairs were brought to such a

pass that, in an army of twenty thousand soldiers, there were not to

be found two thousand foot soldiers. They had, besides this, used

every art to lessen fatigue and danger to themselves and their

soldiers, not killing in the fray, but taking prisoners and liberating

without ransom. They did not attack towns at night, nor did the

garrisons of the towns attack encampments at night; they did not

surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did they campaign

in the winter. All these things were permitted by their military

rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both fatigue

and dangers; thus they have brought Italy to slavery and contempt.

CHAPTER XIII

CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE'S OWN

prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done

by Pope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the

enterprise against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries,

turned to auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain,

for his assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and

good in themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always

disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is

their captive.

And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not

wish to leave this recent one of Pope Julius II, the peril of which

cannot fall to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw

himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune

brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of

his rash choice; because, having auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and

the Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all

expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did

not become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his

auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs.

The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand

Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other

time of their troubles.

The Emperor of Constantinople, to oppose his neighbours, sent ten

thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not

willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece

to the infidels.

Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these

arms, for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because

with them the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield

obedience to others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered,

more time and better opportunities are needed to injure you; they

are not all of one community, they are found and paid by you, and a

third party, which you have made their head, is not able all at once

to assume enough authority to injure you. In conclusion, in

mercenaries dastardy is most dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The

wise prince, therefore, has always avoided these arms and turned to

his own; and has been willing rather to lose with them than to conquer

with others, not deeming that a real victory which is gained with

the arms of others.

I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This

duke entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French

soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards,

such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries,

discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli;

whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and

dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. And the

difference between one and the other of these forces can easily be

seen when one considers the difference there was in the reputation

of the duke, when he had the French, when he had the Orsini and

Vitelli, and when he relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity

he could always count and found it ever increasing; he was never

esteemed more highly than when every one saw that he was complete

master of his own forces.

I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but

I am unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of

those I have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the

army by the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery,

constituted like our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it

appearing to him that he could neither keep them nor let them go, he

had them all cut to pieces, and afterwards made war with his own

forces and not with aliens.

I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament

applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight

with Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage,

Saul armed him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as

he had them on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that

he wished to meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In

conclusion, the arms of others either fall from your back, or they

weigh you down, or they bind you fast.

Charles VII, the father of King Louis XI, having by good fortune and

valour liberated France from the English, recognized the necessity

of being armed with forces of his own, and he established in his

kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and infantry. Afterwards his

son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and began to enlist the

Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as is now seen, a

source of peril to that kingdom; because, having raised the reputation

of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of his own arms,

for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his men-at-arms he

has subordinated to others, for, being as they are so accustomed to

fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that they can now

conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot stand

against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come off

well against others. The armies of the French have thus become

mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms

together are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries

alone, yet much inferior to one's own forces. And this example

proves it, the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the

ordinance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained.

But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks

well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I

have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a

principality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not

truly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if the first

disaster to the Roman Empire should be examined, it will be found to

have commenced only with the enlisting of the Goths; because from that

time the vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all that

valour which had raised it passed away to others.

I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having

its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good

fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And

it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing

can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its

own strength. And one's own forces are those which are composed

either of subjects, citizens, or dependants; all others are

mercenaries or auxiliaries. And the way to take ready one's own forces

will be easily found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected

upon, and if one will consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the

Great, and many republics and princes have armed and organized

themselves, to which rules I entirely commit myself.

CHAPTER XIV

THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE

ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR

A PRINCE ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select

anything else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline;

for this is the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of

such force that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it

often enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on

the contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease

than of arms they have lost their states. And the first cause of

your losing it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire

a state is to be master of the art. Francesco Sforza, through being

martial, from a private person became Duke of Milan; and the sons,

through avoiding the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes became

private persons. For among other evils which being unarmed brings you,

it causes you to be despised, and this is one of those ignominies

against which a prince ought to guard himself, as is shown later on.

Because there is nothing proportionate between the armed and the

unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who is armed should yield

obedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man

should be secure among armed servants. Because, there being in the one

disdain and in the other suspicion, it is not possible for them to

work well together. And therefore a prince who does not understand the

art of war, over and above the other misfortunes already mentioned,

cannot be respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought

never, therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and

in peace he should addict himself more to its exercise than in war;

this he can do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study.

As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well

organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he

accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of

localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the

valleys open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature

of rivers and marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care.

Which knowledge is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know

his country, and is better able to undertake its defence;

afterwards, by means of the knowledge and observation of that

locality, he understands with ease any other which it may be necessary

for him to study hereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains,

and rivers and marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a

certain resemblance to those of other countries, so that with a

knowledge of the aspect of one country one can easily arrive at a

knowledge of others. And the prince that lacks this skill lacks the

essential which it is desirable that a captain should possess, for

it teaches him to surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to lead

armies, to array the battle, to besiege towns to advantage.

Philopoemen, Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which

writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he

never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was

in the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with

them: "If the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find

ourselves here with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How

should one best advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should

wish to retreat, how ought we to set about it? If they should retreat,

how ought we to pursue?" And he would set forth to them, as he went,

all the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to their

opinion and state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by these

continual discussions there could never arise, in time of war, any

unexpected circumstances that he could deal with.

But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories,

and study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have

borne themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories

and defeat, so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and

above all do as an illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one

who had been praised and famous before him, and whose achievements and

deeds he always kept in his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great

imitated Achilles, Caesar Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads

the life of Cyrus, written by Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in

the life of Scipio how that imitation was his glory, and how in

chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to

those things which have been written of Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise

prince ought to observe some such rules, and never in peaceful times

stand idle, but increase his resources with industry in such a way

that they may be available to him in adversity, so that if fortune

changes it may find him prepared to resist her blows.

CHAPTER XV

CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES,

ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED

IT REMAINS now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a

prince towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have

written on this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous

in mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shall

depart from the methods of other people. But, it being my intention to

write a thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it

appears to me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of a matter

than the imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and

principalities which in fact have never been known or seen, because

how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to live, that he

who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects

his ruin than his preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely

up to his professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him

among so much that is evil.

Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know

how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to

necessity. Therefore, putting on one side imaginary things

concerning a prince, and discussing those which are real, I say that

all men when they are spoken of, and chiefly princes for being more

highly placed, are remarkable for some of those qualities which

bring them either blame or praise; and thus it is that one is

reputed liberal, another miserly, using a Tuscan term (because an

avaricious person in our language is still he who desires to possess

by robbery, whilst we call one miserly who deprives himself too much

of the use of his own); one is reputed generous, one rapacious; one

cruel, one compassionate; one faithless, another faithful; one

effeminate and cowardly, another bold and brave; one affable,

another haughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one sincere,

another cunning; one hard, another easy; one grave, another frivolous;

one religious, another unbelieving, and the like. And I know that

every one will confess that it would be most praiseworthy in a

prince to exhibit all the above qualities that are considered good;

but because they can neither be entirely possessed nor observed, for

human conditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be

sufficiently prudent that he may know how to avoid the reproach of

those vices which would lose him his state; and also to keep

himself, if it be possible, from those which would not lose him it;

but this not being possible, he may with less hesitation abandon

himself to them. And again, he need not make himself uneasy at

incurring a reproach for those vices without which the state can

only be saved with difficulty, for if everything is considered

carefully, it will be found that something which looks like virtue, if

followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which looks like

vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity.

CHAPTER XVI

CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS

COMMENCING then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I

say that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless,

liberality exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation

for it, injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should

be exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the

reproach of its opposite. Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among

men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of

magnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts

all his property, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to

maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax

them, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him

odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued

by any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and

rewarded few, he is affected by the very first trouble and

imperilled by whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this

himself, and wishing to draw back from it, he runs at once into the

reproach of being miserly.

Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of

liberality in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if

he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in

time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that

with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself

against all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without

burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he exercises

liberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless,

and meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few.

We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who

have been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the

Second was assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for

liberality, yet he did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he

made war on the King of France; and he made many wars without imposing

any extraordinary tax on his subjects, for he supplied his

additional expenses out of his long thriftiness. The present King of

Spain would not have undertaken or conquered in so many enterprises if

he had been reputed liberal. A prince, therefore, provided that he has

not to rob his subjects, that he can defend himself, that he does

not become poor and abject, that he is not forced to become rapacious,

ought to hold of little account a reputation for being mean, for it is

one of those vices which will enable him to govern.

And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and

many others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal,

and by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact,

or in a way to become one. In the first case this liberality is

dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered

liberal; and Caesar was one of those who wished to become

pre-eminent in Rome; but if he had survived after becoming so, and had

not moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed his government.

And if any one should reply: Many have been princes, and have done

great things with armies, who have been considered very liberal, I

reply: Either a prince spends that which is his own or his subjects'

or else that of others. In the first case he ought to be sparing, in

the second he ought not to neglect any opportunity for liberality. And

to the price who goes forth with his army, supporting it by pillage,

sack, and extortion, handling that which belongs to others, this

liberality is necessary, otherwise he would not be followed by

soldiers. And of that which is neither yours nor your subjects' you

can be a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it

does not take away your reputation if you squander that of others, but

adds to it; it is only squandering your own that injures you.

And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even

whilst you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become

either poor or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and

hated. And a prince should guard himself, above all things, against

being despised and hated; and liberality leads you to both.

Therefore it is wiser to have a reputation for meanness which brings

reproach without hatred, than to be compelled through seeking a

reputation for liberality to incur a name for rapacity which begets

reproach with hatred.

CHAPTER XVII

CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND

WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED

COMING now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that

every prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel.

Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare

Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled

the Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And

if this be rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much

more merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation

for cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed. Therefore a prince, so

long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind

the reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more

merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to

arise, from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to

injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate

with a prince offend the individual only.

And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the

imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers.

Hence Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her

reign owing to its being new, saying:

Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt

Moliri, et late fines custode tueri.*

* ...against my will, my fate,

A throne unsettled, and an infant state,

Bid me defend my realms with all my pow'rs,

And guard with these severities my shores.

Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should

he himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with

prudence and humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him

incautious and too much distrust render him intolerable.

Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than

feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish

to be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one

person, is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two,

either must be dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in

general of men, that they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly,

covetous, and as long as you succeed they are yours entirely; they

will offer you their blood, property, life and children, as is said

above, when the need is far distant; but when it approaches they

turn against you. And that prince who, relying entirely on their

promises, has neglected other precautions, is ruined; because

friendships that are obtained by payments, and not by greatness or

nobility of mind, may indeed be earned, but they are not secured,

and in time of need cannot be relied upon; and men have less scruple

in offending one who is beloved than one who is feared, for love is

preserved by the link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of

men, is broken at every opportunity for their advantage; but fear

preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails.

Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if

he does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very

well being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long

as he abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from

their women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the

life of someone, he must do it on proper justification and for

manifest cause, but above all things he must keep his hands off the

property of others, because men more quickly forget the death of their

father than the loss of their patrimony. Besides, pretexts for

taking away the property are never wanting; for he who has once

begun to live by robbery will always find pretexts for seizing what

belongs to others; but reasons for taking life, on the contrary, are

more difficult to find and sooner lapse. But when a prince is with his

army, and has under control a multitude of soldiers, then it is

quite necessary for him to disregard the reputation of cruelty, for

without it he would never hold his army united or disposed to its

duties.

Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that

having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to

fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or

against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This

arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his

boundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of his

soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not

sufficient to produce this effect. And shortsighted writers admire his

deeds from one point of view and from another condemn the principal

cause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not have been

sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that most

excellent man, not of his own times but within the memory of man,

against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this arose

from nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his soldiers

more licence than is consistent with military discipline. For this

he was upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the

corrupter of the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a

legate of Scipio, yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the

insolence of the legate punished, owing entirely to his easy nature.

Insomuch that someone in the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there

were many men who knew much better how not to err than to correct

the errors of others. This disposition, if he had been continued in

the command, would have destroyed in time the fame and glory of

Scipio; but, he being under the control of the Senate, this

injurious characteristic not only concealed itself, but contributed to

his glory.

Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the

conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing

according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish

himself on that which is in his own control and not in that of others;

he must endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted.

CHAPTER XVIII

CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH

EVERY one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith,

and to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our

experience has been that those princes who have done great things have

held good faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent

the intellect of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those

who have relied on their word. You must know there are two ways of

contesting, the one by the law, the other by force; the first method

is proper to men, the second to beasts; but because the first is

frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the

second. Therefore it is necessary for a prince to understand how to

avail himself of the beast and the man. This has been figuratively

taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how Achilles and

many other princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse,

who brought them up in his discipline; which means solely that, as

they had for a teacher one who was half beast and half man, so it is

necessary for a prince to know how to make use of both natures, and

that one without the other is not durable. A prince, therefore,

being compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the

fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself against

snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. Therefore, it

is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to

terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not

understand what they are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor

ought he to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against

him, and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no

longer. If men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but

because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are

not bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a

prince legitimate reasons to excuse this nonobservance. Of this

endless modern examples could be given, showing how many treaties